Many engineering problems involve interactions between multiple decisions makers, or stakeholders, each with their own objectives and uncertainties. Considering these interactions during design optimization allows us to account for new sources of uncertainty, which we refer to as economic uncertainty. In this paper, we consider an application of optimization considering interactions between aircraft designers and airlines based on the design of a commercial transport aircraft wing. We consider that the aircraft designer makes their design decisions first, and therefore must predict the reaction of the airline. We focus on the effect of two economic uncertainties: uncertainty that would normally only affect the airline and uncertainty due to asymmetric information, or errors in the designers’ understanding of the airlines’ preferences. We find that these uncertainties play a significant role in the optimal decisions by both airlines and designers. We also show that asymmetric information may actually be beneficial for both stakeholders in certain cases, where both players benefit from the aircraft designer underestimating the operating costs of the airline.

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